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EDMOND CAHN AND THE SEARCH FOR
EMPIRICAL JUSTICE
JAY

I.

A.

SIGLERt

THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDMOND

CAHN

T HE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY of Edmond Cahn represents one of
the most original approaches to the problems of jurisprudence to be
found among American writers. Departing from the dominant tradition
of sociological jurisprudence, Cahn sought to supply moral guidelines
to the law, to redefine the concept of justice, and to avoid the relativistic shortcomings of most American jurisprudence. In so doing,
Cahn wished to avoid a return to natural -law. His search for an
alternative to natural law is instructive but, ultimately, unsatisfactory.
Various writers have sought to classify Cahn, but few agree
on the proper category. Professor Cowan considers him a legal
idealist,' while Professor Bodenheimer claims that Cahn "isin many
important aspects of his thought connected with the realist movement
in American jurisprudence" because of the emphasis placed by Cahn
on the intuitive responses of judges to concrete fact situations.' Professor Davitt considers Cahn unrealistic,3 while others hold that Cahn
is worthy of only minor footnote treatment. Cahn defies easy classification because, as an experienced scholar of jurisprudence, he has
attempted to avoid many prior errors of overstatement.
That Cahn presents some alternatives to the insights of sociological
jurisprudence is unquestionable. He perceives that the standards of
that school are quite vague and rather disquieting. All jurists are
familiar with the "balancing-of-equities" approach; Cahn says that it
is only a slight advance on reactionary natural law nomenclature
because "the truth of the matter is that even if two conflicting or
competing interests could somehow be weighed against each other,
a judge might 'fix' his own scale in half a dozen different ways
before the alleged 'weighing' began." 4
Professor Cahn attempts in his writing to create a new attitude in
jurisprudence which would make it less disdainful of the mass of the
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University, College of South
Jersey. B.A., Rutgers University, 1954, LL.B., 1957, M.A., 1960, Ph.D., 1962.
1. THE AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE READER 26 (Cowan ed. 1956).
2. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 143 (1962).
3. DAvir, THE EL MENTS or LAW 148 (1959).
4. Cahn, Firstnessof the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464, 479 (1956).
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population. Legal philosophies had been, in his view, traditionally
contemptuous of popular judgment and indifferent to the aspirations
of ordinary citizens. Cahn believes that democratic law is a definite
area of jurisprudence.' In democratic law the distinguishing characteristic is its autonomy. Democratic man legislates for himself both
by choosing representatives and "by intuiting the intentional value of
jural situations as his private sense of injustice becomes progressively
immanent in the public conscience. ' The creation of a democratic
jurisprudence is Cahn's self-assigned task.
Democratic jurisprudence requires a new perspective on law, a
"consumer perspective," by examining a legal predicament from the
standpoint of the individual affected by the outcome.7 The traditional,
classical theorists of law failed to face the legal responsibilities created
by the adoption of political democracy. Those who "fear to turn
the juristic world upside down and adopt the new democratic perspective" are confused. 8 A new factor in the nature of injustice has
arisen since 1781, and it is that all democratic citizens are involved in
criminal law because we are all -identified with the district attorney.
In a larger sense, representative government implicates us all so that
"we are participants - accomplices, if you will - in the deeds that
are done in our name and by our authority."9 Without explicitly
stating his premise, Cahn has made all democratic citizens morally
accountable as principals for the acts of their legal agents, the
officials of government. Democratic jurisprudence, then, creates new
responsibilities not heretofore recognized in legal writing. Cahn is
not merely saying that "all men are brothers" but rather that all
democratic men are actively responsible for the condition of democratic law.
Cahn believed that law writers adhere too closely to written texts,
whether they be statutes or cases. Cases themselves may turn on
inarticulate policies, base prejudices, or noble flashes of insight.'"
These factors tend to be overlooked by scholars.
Cahn's attempt to create a democratic jurisprudence is buttressed
by his reliance on fact-skepticism, especially as found in the writings
5. Cahn, Goethe's View of Law, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 904, 915, 920 (1949).
6. Cahn, Freedom, Order and Law, 23 N.Y.U.L. RsZv. 20, 70 (1948).
7. Cahn, The Consumers of Injustice, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 1166 (1959). See also,

CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT op DEMOCRArIC MAN 31 (1961), where, speaking of Bartkus
v. Illinois, 357 U.S. 121 (1959), Cahn praises Justice Black's dissent because of its
employment of the consumer perspective.

8. Cahn, The Consumers of Injustice, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1166, 1173 (1959).
9. Id. at 1171.
10. Cahn, Some Reflections on Aims of Legal Education, 11 J. LXGAL ED. 1 (1958).
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of Jerome Frank. As Cahn says, the fact skeptic relishes the present
with a special confidence.
His very questionings and doubtings have earned him the right
to declare that men possess an enormously wider and more diverse
register of individual and social choices than they have ever
exercised."
Thus, fact-skepticism leads to a respect for the unique individual
and the unique situation, as well as opening great ranges of individual
choice. Cahn also calls on the fact-skeptics to reexamine familiar
assumptions in law, such as those surrounding legislative review. 2
Fact-skepticism leads to the conclusion that capital punishment should
be abolished in American law.' 8 On the other hand, fact-skepticism
should create a suspicion of evidence given by social psychologists and
others whose facts are not subject to verification or examination.' 4
Edmond Cahn is most famous for his concept of "the sense of
injustice." This important notion, which is an expansion of an
observation to be found in Aristotle's Politics,5 is another aspect of
Cahn's democratic jurisprudence. From it "the democratic citizen and
the democratic state find their best, eventual hope of cohesion and
survival."' 6 The sense of injustice is felt, typically, when officials
violate common expectations of democratic society such as demands
for equality, for 'human dignity, for conscientious adjudication, "for
the confinement of government to its proper functions.""
It might appear that Cahn's sense of injustice is limited to the
particular political and social values of a few nations. Yet he insists
that the feeling is universal in character. Law in pre-democratic
states may not be responsive to the sense of injustice, but as the
state evolves from brutality to consent and eliminates primitive features it will accord more closely to the sense of injustice. The sense
of injustice serves as a "prime evolutionary impetus" both in the
development of law and of the democratic state itself."8 It must be
assumed, then, that the sense of injustice is in operation in all societies
although its impact is most felt in the law of democratic states.
11. Cahn, Jerome Frank's Fact--Skepticism and Our Future, 66 YALE L.J. 824,
831 (1957).
12. Cahn, Fact-Skepticism and Fundamental Law, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1, 13 (1958).
13. CARN, THt MORAL DiCISION 264 (1956).
14. Cahn, Jurisprudence, in 1955 ANNUAL SURVEY or AMItRICAN LAW 655. See
also, Cahn, The Consumers of Injustice, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1166, 1175 (1959).
15. Cahn's legal philosophy is generally modelled after Aristotle, especially in the
ETHICS, Book V. Cahn's conception of justice as being broader than law is definitely
Aristotelian.
16. Cahn, The Consumers of Injustice, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1166, 1181 (1959).
17. Id. at 1179.
18. CAHN, THt SENSt Or INJUSTICE 49 (1949).
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Because of the inbuilt sense of injustice it is possible to identify
the nature of justice in an empirical fashion. Previously, the notion of
"justice" has become shrouded in metaphysical mists and confusions.
It may be impossible to perceive justice, but it is demonstrably possible
to perceive injustice.' 9 That is the function of the sense of injustice to render empirical guidance to those who seek to do justice.
Cahn insists that the sense of injustice is not merely a glandular
intuitive reaction. It is both rational and irrational, using "empathy,
projection and emotion, [and] simultaneously summons perception,
reasoning, intelligence, and judgment .. ." Each democratic citizen

exercises this sense whenever, in an existential fashion, he personally
or vicariously experiences the impact of an act of injustice.21 Justice
is to be obtained as a result of an experiential reference to the immediate feelings common to all men. Accordingly, Cahn's major book,
The Sense of Injustice, is devoted largely to cases which test the
sensibilities of its readers. Not all the cases are resolved, but even a
suspension of final judgment reveals the uncertain quality of justice
in some fact situations.
In many ways Cahn's point of view is similar to that expressed
in the French existential writer Albert Camus' novel, The Fall, in
which the protagonist is forced to judge guilt in highly ambiguous
situations. 22 Finding the task difficult to complete on a purely positive law basis, Camus' lawyer-hero searches into his conscience and
is himself forced to recreate criminal acts.
The dilemma of Camus' lawyer, who is forced to become a
criminal, indicates one of the possible deficiencies of the sense of
injustice - that it is not always easy to respond directly to an
injustice. One's feelings may be mixed, impure, ambiguous. In addition, how can one be certain that everyone's sense of injustice is
identical? Are some more sensitive and accurate than others? However, in defense of Cahn, who does not confront these problems, it
may be suggested that the moral corrective of the sense of injustice
is still better than no corrective at all. It is better to attempt to do
justice than to claim that justice is purely a philosophical fiction.
Perhaps scientific study of sample reactions to legal situations will
permit verification of the sense of injustice in operation, although
Cahn would not approve.2 3
19. Cahn, Justice, Power and Law, 55 YALE L.J. 336, 341 (1945).
20. Cahn, The Consumers of Injustice, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1166, 1180 (1959).
21. Id. at 1176-77.
22. CAMUS, TH FALL (1956).
23. Cahn seemed doubtful about statistical studies which "can test our assumptions,
but only the ones that least need testing; and the values that really mark the problem
as a moral one are somehow lost when we take the case out of a germ-laden world
into an antiseptic and sterile clinic." CAHN, THX MORAL DEcISION 256-57 (1956).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss2/2

4

Sigler: Edmond Cahn and the Search for Empirical Justice
WINTER

1967]

SEARCH

FOR EMPIRICAL

JUSTICE

Cahn does not state that justice is the sole or primary ingredient
of positive law. "There are," he says, "great realms of justice outside
of positive law, [while] there are wide areas of positive law where

justice is of weak or indifferent influence." 24 This declaration may
seem rather startling since most jurists would like to 'believe the law
to be intrinsically just. But it must be remembered that courts,
juries, and other institutions, cannot have assigned to them the moral
duties which belong to each democratic individual.25 The sense of
injustice is present in legislation, joining "the expectation of regularity to a co-equal expectation of progression."2 6 It is present in
such concepts as "due process of law."2 But there are many interests
other than justice which go to make law. Economic needs, professional
demands for symmetry, and other social factors may play as great
a role in establishing legal rules. Cahn does not even say that law
will, except as a matter of democratic faith, move further in the direction
of justice.2" Indeed, certain species of injustice, such as racial discrimination or sexual assaults may be "inherently beyond the reach
of reparation."2 Justice is only one element in any legal equation, even
to the extent to which it may 'be revealed by our sense of injustice.
There will be times when law must bypass justice, but law should
never ignore justice. What then is the use of the sense of injustice?
Cahn believed that it supplied a dramatic emphasis to the law :3
[T]he good may be modified when it makes its appearance as the
good-in-law...
Where the
notion of
good seems
excessively:

The Good-in-law
can supply:

But in law
there is risk of:

Vague

Projection by virtue
of drama
Precision

Neutral or
Irresolute

Intervention and
Decisiveness

Utopian

Responsibility

Contest of wits between
trial lawyers
Absorption with
technicalities
Meddlesomeness,
Attribution of
Artificial Guilts
Philistinism

Abstract

24.

CAHN, THE SENSE 01' INJUSTICE

28 (1949).

25. Cahn says "we cannot assign our moral duty to an institution ..
of social welfare legislation. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 197 (1956).
26. Cahn, Justice, Power and Law, 55 YALE L.J. 336, 357 (1945).
27. CAHN, THE MORAL DncISION 259-60 (1956).
28. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 32 (1949).
29. CAHN, THE PR DICAMENT or DEMOCRATIC MAN 50 (1961).
30. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 56-57 (1956).

in speaking
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The sense of injustice is, then, one of the many useful tools for the
fabrication of law. The sense of injustice should be studied "not as a
product or effect, but as an operative cause in the law.""1
Some judges have been especially sensitive to the community sense
of injustice. Cahn singles out Justice Hugo Black for having an
unsurpassed sense of injustice.8 2 The Supreme Court has, year by
year, brought "more intelligent analysis to the moral aspects of legal
problems. 8 8S On the other hand, Judge Learned Hand is criticized
for "subordinating his own moral principles to those of the marketplace," thus distorting "the function of the court as pedagogue and
moral mentor in a democratic society." 4 In making this criticism
Cahn indicates a serious inconsistency in his view of the sense of
injustice; for if the sense of injustice is universal, it must be found
in the marketplace, and if a judge must impose his moral views, then
the sense of injustice is much less universal.
What are the merits of Cahn's theory of the "sense of injustice" ?
If one accepts the possibility of identifying injustice, then Cahn has
removed the critical deficiency of contemporary sociological jurisprudence - its absence of consistent moral norms, its value relativism. In addition, the sense of injustice supplies an element of
"higher law" by which current law and practice may be evaluated
without resort to mystical natural law abstractions. The advantage
of the sense of injustice is that it is concrete, immediate, and perceivable. Although Cahn appears not to have realized it, his moral
philosophy closely parallels the conclusions of scientific philosophers of
the logical-empiricist persuasion, a dominant philosophical persuasion.
These writers, deploring abstract ethical notions, appeal instead to
immediate moral insights of an intuitive order.8 8
Aside from Cahn's moral insights into legal philosophy, his
general theory of law is also useful, if less original. Cahn defends
the social compact explanation of the origin of legal obligation." He
does not adhere to a literal view of the compact, but regards the
notion as indicative of the social sources of law. Cahn also attempts
to present historical-sociological analysis of the development of legal
rules in terms of the growth of individuation. Law begins by treating
31.
32.
(1962).
33.
34.
35.
recently

Cahn, Justice, Power and Law, 55 YALt L.J. 336, 348 (1945).
Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment Absolutes, 37 N.Y.U.L. R~v. 549

Cahn, A New Kind of Society, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 9 (Cahn ed. 1963).
Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51 COLUM. L. Rev. 838, 844 (1951).
This view is clearest in MOORR, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (1922). It has been most
stated in STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944) and in AYER, LANGUAGE,
TRUTH AND LoGic (1948).
36. Cahn, Ego and Equality, 60 YALE L.J. 57, 64 (1951). Cahn finds that the
concept of equality rests upon a social compact which, if rejected, gives rise to a
general resentment and provokes the sense of injustice.
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people as things, but as things change so will the laws regulating their
movement. In this ingenious fashion Cahn explains the changing
rules of contract law." Law also controls the relative movement of
economic groups.
Cahn's view of law as a means of social control of vertical
mobility permits him to observe that the prohibitions of the criminal
code affects the course of individual ascent in a negative fashion,
while "the tenets and institutions of civil law show him the positive
path."8 81 In this attempt to account for change in legal rules Cahn
does not draw from available historical and sociological research, thus
presenting a -sweeping and impressionistic overview which, while suggestive, is not penetrating. Nonetheless, Cahn does have a 'breadth
of vision available to few other legal philosophers.
The greatest shortcoming of Edmond Cahn's legal philosophy is
its lack of contact with trends in general philosophy. Cahn is very
critical of two leading scientific philosophers, Nagel and Reichenbach,
for their rejection of moral concerns,89 which is a misunderstanding
of their philosophical positions. Yet, Cahn perceives the monumental
inadequacy of John Dewey as a scientific philosopher.4" Cahn equates
science with experimentation and statistical analysis. He feels that
experiments may interfere with the .spontaneity of law4" and that
statistical analysis tends to degrade the role of the individual. 2 But
the most recent developments in philosophy have gone far beyond the
crude notions of science alluded to by Cahn. The scientific enterprise has been aided by the analysis of the philosophy of science
movement. There is no reason why the study of jurisprudence may not
benefit in similar fashion, 'but Cahn ignores this possibility.
In the final analysis, Edmond Cahn's philosophy is another
variety of legal pragmatism, leavened by the insights of Jerome Frank's
fact-skepticism, but constructed with an awareness of the inadequacies of that approach. To the pragmatic flux of American jurisprudence
Cahn seems to add the certainty of higher moral principles as derived
from the "sense of injustice." In one of Cahn's last major essays this
view becomes quite clear:
[F]act-skepticism alone does not assure the advancement of
justice .. . its capacities for application are morally ambivalent,
37. Cahn, Freedom, Order and Law, 23 N.Y.U.L. Riv. 20, 24-26 (1948).
38. Id. at 38.
39. Cahn, Jurisprudence, in 1960 ANNUAL SURVEY op AMERICAN LAW 593-94.
40. Cahn, The Lawyer as Scientist and Scoundrel, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 6 (1961).
41. "I wish to suggest that, in the areas of scientific interest which impinge on
government and law, there are limits to the permissibility of experimentation, that the
limits are imposed by institutional factors on the one hand and moral factors on the
other.... ." Id. at 9.

42. Cahn, The Consumers of Injustice, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rrv. 1166, 1175 (1959).
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and . . . in order to serve the high purposes to which Jerome

Frank was dedicated, it requires the extrinsic governance of a
sympathetic intelligence and a humane conscience."
Cahn assigned the task of carrying on the work of determining how
far fact-skepticism may be carried to other philosophers."" He was
aware that something was lacking in the analysis of Jerome Frank.
Cahn supplied the moral factor as an improvement and addition, but
there his enterprise terminated. It is to be hoped that still more work
will be expended on this aspect of jurisprudence, because in it may be
the future of legal philosophy.
Edmond Cahn has severely criticized pragmatism because it is
amoral, lacking a base in ethical theory,4 5 yet he has stated that "at
its best -

which can be superbly good -

the whole legal process is

pragmatic and empirical. '4 He has attempted to identify universal
notions of injustice, but limits them to particular societies and special
conditions. He has indicated the significant relationship of law and
morality, but has separated the two more sharply. In raising doubts
about the adequacy of sociological jurisprudence he has left a valuable
legacy, yet more new questions are raised to which his beneficiaries
must turn their attention. In another sense, however, Cahn seeks
to return to an older philosophic tradition - to Aristotle who first
indicated the relationship of 'law and morality. It was Aristotle also
who claimed that there was a unique democratic conception of justice,
which is the enjoyment of arithmetic equality.4 7 Edmond Cahn has
expanded upon a great master. Cahn is attempting to resist the most
recent trends in philosophy and to return to absolute verities, as one of
his latest articles indicates:
As I see it, the single most important fallacy of twentieth century
thought is that we have homogenized our relativism. Spurred by
semantics and anthropology, philosophy has taught that all propositions and judgments
are relative, and legal philosophy has
48
echoed this teaching.
43. Cahn, Fact-Skepticism: An Unexpected Chapter, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1034

(1963).

44. Cahn, Jerome Frank's Fact-Skepticism and Our Future, 66 YALE L.J. 824
(1957). Philosophers "will wish to consider how deeply and how far fact-skepticism
may affect Peirce's doctrine that the meaning of a concept is to be found in its conceived consequences and James' doctrines that 'the true' is the long-run expedient in
our way of thinking." Cahn, supra at 830. These allusions to general philosophy indicate Cahn's commitment to the philosophers of pragmatism.
45. See THE AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCt READER 23-24 (Cowan ed. 1956).
46. Cahn, The Lawyer as Scientist and Scoundrel, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1, 11 (1961).
47. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICs, Book VI, Chapter II, lines 6-10 (Modern Library
ed. 1951).
48. Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L.REv. 1 (1963).
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The culmination of Cahn's thought appears in The Predicament
of Democratic Man. In this work Cahn carries his search for justice
and morality within a pragmatic framework to its logical limit. While
attempting to define the moral responsibility of democratic citizens
for the immoral acts of government, Cahn simply rejects all views
of collective guilt by delimiting an area of individual responsibility
through a device which he calls the "citizen's self-search." The selfsearch not only specifies moral guilt, it also seems to limit and restrict
it. "To the humane and decent citizen it offers a rational standard
of judgment, a riddance of confusion, and an eventually serene conscience." 49 The self-search provides an alternative to natural law by
smoothing over the difficult issues of political and social collective
responsibility by posing and answering the following pragmatic
catechism

:50

First. Did I incite the official to commit a wrong?
Second. Did I authorize the wrong?
Third. Was I reckless in helping to install a conspicuously
dangerous public instrument?
Fourth. Did I reman silent when I might have prevented
a wrong about to be perpetrated?
Fifth. Did I ratify the act of wrong or knowingly accept
its fruits ?
Sixth. Did I suppress the truth when it came to my notice
and thus became an accessory after the fact?
Seventh. Before the wrong was committed, had I contributed
to the vulnerability of the victim?
The highest morality conceived by this eminently humane legal
philosopher is one of prudent, thoughtful, selfishness. Pressing common sense to the limit, Cahn has ignored the sense of guilt, of angst,
of existential solidarity, of positive mutual moral responsibility. Cahn
is no outraged moralist seeking to undo the wrongs of society, but,
instead, a skillful lawyer seeking to narrow the moral liability of himself as a client. Cahn has reached the moral limits of pragmatism.
Edmond Cahn was bitterly opposed to the idea of natural law
because "history shows us that natural law is a flag that anyone
can nail to his mast" and "it has been used to justify slavery as well
as freedom, persecution as well as fairness, exploitation as well as
49. CAHN, THE
50. Id. at 77-83.

PRUDICAMICNT oP DEMOCRATIC MAN 111 (1961).
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equality."'" He feared that natural law would confer virtually unlimited
authority on the judge because "there is no authoritative secular text
52
in which he can find the rules of natural law."
Yet Cahn yearned for moral absolutes in the flux of a relativistic
legal universe. He was certain that the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and especially the first amendment, provided those absolutes in
a textual form." Other moral values were secular and of human
creation. Moral standards were, generally, progressive and evolutionary so that men could "create moral standards superior to those
54
their fathers evolved."1
Ultimately, however, Cahn's attempt to provide a substitute for
natural law is a failure because of its contradictory character.5
He
attempts to provide a definition of injustice based at various times
upon reason, common sense, raw emotion, a fixed written text, and
history. Through the numerous writings of Edmond Cahn may be
found numerous and divergent foundations for his moral system.
Cahn does not foresee the possibility of conflicting standards derived
from conflicting foundations. Cahn did not want to reduce morality
to the level of the mores of the majority but he sought vainly for a
permanent source of value which pragmatism was unable to supply.
The flaw in the system of Edmond Cahn is not due to any lack of
moral insight or fervor. In his anxiety to fly from the supposed weakness of natural law he missed an opportunity to add to the development of legal philosophy. The end product was a moral system lacking
firm foundation, based upon a vague sense of moral unrest.
Edmond Cahn is among the first legal philosophers to attempt to
find a moral basis for law outside the natural law tradition. On purely
logical grounds it would seem to be a possible accomplishment. However, the burden of creating such a system is a heavy one, since some
alternate source of value must 'be proposed and defended. An emotive
basis for moral values could be such a foundation but Cahn hesitated to
reach that drastic conclusion. If every man can "feel injustice" -then
every man is an equal and private source of judgment. Cahn retreated
to a higher law found in the Bill of Rights. Others have found it in
natural law.
51. Cahn, The Parchment Barriers, 32 TH4

AMERICAN SCHOLAR

21, 26 (1963).

52. Id. at 34.
53. See Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment Absolutes, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rtv.
549 (1962) ; Cahn, Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALz L.J. 464 (1956).
54. CAHN, THP MORAL DMCSION 314 (1956).
55. Professor Norman Redlich rightly defends Cahn against the charge of being
paradoxical in his rejection of natural law on tht ground that there could be a moral
system of law outside of the natural law tradition. Redlich, Edmond Cahn: A Philosopher for Democratic Man, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 259, 266 (1965). The question is whether
Cahn has succeeded.
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FOR AN EMPIRICAL NORM OF JUSTICE

Edmond Cahn has not been alone in his search for the meaning of
the concept of justice. Prominent legal philosophers, both within and
without the natural law school, have sought the elusive character of
empirical justice. There is little agreement among modern writers,
although there is less disagreement as to the quantity of justice which
law could or should contain.
Among the most highly regarded legal philosophers is the British
writer, H.L.A. Hart. Hart, more bluntly than Cahn, admits that he
is searching for a kind of empirical natural law, lacking teleology,
and based upon observable and fixed needs of human beings and
society.5 6 Bodenheimer agrees that normative legal postulates exist
which are founded upon the physical or psychic constitution of man,
and finds these in the need of food, sleep, sex and the love for his
offspring.57 Hart identifies five truisms of human nature: "human
vulnerability," "approximate equality," "limited altruism," "limited
resources," "limited understanding and strength of will.""8
Other writers have emphasized the procedural aspects of "justice."
According to John Rawls, the language analyst, every people possesses
a concept of justice which requires procedural fairness:
A practice is just if it is in accordance with the principles which
all who participate in it might reasonably be expected to propose
or acknowledge .. . when it meets standards which the parties

could accept as fair should occasion arise for them to debate its
merits. 59
Ross insists that the words "just" and "unjust" cannot be applied
to characterize a law or an order, but only to conformity or nonconformity with the rule or system of rules in force.6 0 However,
Ross is forced to admit that at times a judge may permit challenge
of the rule itself, by applying the tool of his "material legal consciousness," which is an ultra-rational ground of legal criticism derived
from the judge's professional perception of social needs. 6 ' This legal
consciousness is different from a mere sense of morality because it
Or LAW 187-88 (1961).
57. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 188 (1962).

56. HART, THn CONCEPT

58. HART, op. cit. supra note 56, at 189-95.
59. Rawls, Justice as Fairness,in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 2ND SERIES
148 (Lasslett & Runciman ed. 1962). Equality of treatment is also emphasized by HART,
op. cit. supra note 56, at 202.

60. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 274 (1959). Injustice merely means that the
judge allows himself to be guided by personal interest, friendship or some other motive
apart from the legal command. Ross, op. cit. supra at 284.
61. Id. at 138.
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concerns the organized social regulation of the community, not the
personal relations among men.
Cahn recognizes the necessity of a socially oriented moral system
which "would emphasize the fears and devisiveness that results from
men's distrusting their neighbors" and which would, to a considerable
extent, be advanced by his model of "the equitable judge."
That
there might be a conflict between the moral views of judge and jury
was not explored by Cahn, although empirical evidence seems to point
to that possibility. Judges and juries might differ in their conceptions
of justice.6" The problem of conflict between the judge's notion of
justice and that of the community has never been adequately met by
legal philosophers."4 Even the jurors may disagree among themselves
in their perception of the justice of the legal situation.65
Although Edmond Cahn assumes that the individual sense of
injustice and the community sense of injustice would coincide, his
approach is basically a projection of individual values of a democratic
citizen whose feelings determine the community aspirations for justice.
For many other scholars, as for Karl Llewellyn, there is no justification for emphasis upon the individual in the search for justice because
of individual differences and the fact that individual values "exist only
in the context of a society which is itself a context of groups and
needs." 6
If the search for justice (and the sense of injustice) leads us to
the group, we should expect that the field of anthropology would
provide jurisprudents with a purer form of justice embodied in primitive social institutions. In simple group structures one might hope to
discover the basic character of "justice." Unfortunately, recent anthropological research fails to supply the unalloyed essence of justice.
For example, justice among the Barotse usually consists of judicial
bias in favor of accepted community norms.6 7 The separation of law
62.

CAHN,

TH4

MORAL

DECISION 298-99 (1956).

63. Judge and jury often do not agree on verdicts in criminal cases. Agreement,
in one study, was found in 80% of the cases, with disagreement in 20%. In 18 (of
the 20% total), the jury acquitted where the judge would have convicted, while in
only 2% of the cases it is the other way around. Thus, it would appear that jurors
might be more lenient than judges (based on a 40 entry questionnaire on a sample of
1200 cases). Zeisel, Social Research on the Law, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 138 (Evan
ed. 1962).
64. Carter believed that the judge should follow community notions, while Gray
believed that the judge should follow his own perception. CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN,
GROWTH AND FUNCTION 193 (1932); GRAY, THx NATURE AND SOURCE O' THE LAW 271
(1931). Cardozo felt that the judge "would be under a duty to conform to the accepted
standards of the community, the mores of the time." CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 108 (1925).
65. See McCARTY, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 406 (1960).
66. LL-WELLYN, JURISPRUDENcE 204 (1962).
67. GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1965).
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and ethics, a starting point for most legal philosophers, is not accepted
by many anthropologists.6" Justice among African tribes might signify
anything from self-help to the use of elaborate judicial procedures of
a highly sophisticated order.6 9
In the absence of any better clue to the nature of justice, Edmond
Cahn's concept of the "sense of injustice" may yet prove to be a fair
point of departure for future studies. Bengler and Meerloo's psychoanalytic examination of justice and injustice is the one serious psycho70
logical study in the vein of Cahn's empirical ideas yet to be made.
These authors suggest that the ideal of justice is embodied in each
man's ego ideal as a residue of parental admonitions. The concept of
justice "brings 'order' into the chaos of a world ruled by capricious
fate" and "humanity also uses the sense of justice as a means of
preserving self-esteem in the face of incomprehensible adversity.""
The authors penetrate beyond Cahn's superficial analysis to indicate
that disturbed personalities may actually cherish injustice. The
neurotic, the psychic-masochist and the criminal are all able to identify
justice and injustice, although they may choose injustice over justice.
Bengler and Meerloo provide a personal history of the sense of
injustice in the child's "horror, outrage, anxiety, shock, and resentment at the way the outside world deals with him." 2 The authors
add a further dimension to the sense of injustice by identifying its
emotional relevance for the inner biological and psychological needs
of the personality, permitting an inner mobilization against personal
threats of deprivation and violation. However, pending further investigation, the idea still remains rather vague.
III.

RESORT TO NATURAL LAW

The pursuit of the path of empirical justice has led us to uncertain ground. Although many writers concur that there ought to 'be an
adequate empirical description of justice, none, as yet, has found a
satisfactory one. The very pursuit itself has been best exemplified in
the writing of Edmond Cahn, but even there, it has come to little more
than the older natural law affirmation, echoed by Bengler and Meerloo,
"that there seems to exist in man a vivid and strong sense of right and
TIMASHEFr, AN INTRODUCTION TO THS SOCIOLOGY or LAW 68-77 (1939).
EVANS-PRITCHARD, THt NUtR 164-65 (1940) describes a society built on a

68. See

69.

concept of ultimate self-help.

EPSTEIN, JURIDICAL TECHNIQUIES AND THS JUDICIAL

(1954) gives a good survey of elaborated procedure, including references to
magical practices.
70. BHNGLER & MsERLOO, JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE (1963).
71. Id. at 19.
72. Id. at 122.
PROCESS
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wrong."" Increasingly, legal thinkers of many persuasions. have come
to the realization that a modernized version of natural law may be
an indispensable critical tool of legal analysis. This realization has
usually been reached reluctantly, even grudgingly, but the positivist
tradition may have begun to wear itself out. Realist jurisprudence,
however enlightening, cannot supplant older concerns for ethical jurisprudence. It has proved a healthy antidote for the sterile analytical
school and the metaphysical approach to natural law, but it is incom74
plete without attention to basic ethical considerations.
The jurisprudence of interests may be seen as but another side
to the natural law, since it attempts to establish a connection between
the law and the rational needs of men. 5 Natural law subsumes all
human interests, including that of public policy, but possesses the
advantage of providing a measure for interests. When differing legitimate social interests contend, which is to prevail? Only a larger social
philosophy can supply the answer.
The realist error may be the excessive reliance upon the particular, the single case, the particular dispute. Thus, law is seen as a series
of isolated judgments. Taken to the extreme, as in the writings of
Jerome Frank, it implies that there is no -law until the judge pronounces upon it.7 6' The flight to the particular ,has, properly, focussed
attention upon the concrete activity of judging, 'but fails to consider
the universal aspects of that activity. Karl Llewellyn has recognized the
need for a "lawyer's natural law," a natural law directed at specific
legal disputes, but admits the existence of "natural law in the philosopher's sense ...as a keystone and as a touchstone for his own [the
'77
lawyer's] labors while it leaves those actual labors still to be done."
Edgar Bodenheimer :is among those who believe that there are
postulates of a normative variety beyond those of the positive lawgiver which provide "an element of necessity in natural law" derived
from the empirical basis of human nature, a nature which may change
and improve, causing a parallel change in natural law.7 ' This observation has been amplified by Jerome Hall, who adds -intelligence to the
deeper instinctual drives of emotion as a principle of modernized natural
law.70
73. Ibid.
74. Cf. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 257 (1960); Llewellyn, On Reading and
Using the New Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. Rev. 581 (1940) ; McDougall, Fuller v.
the American Legal Realists; An Intervention, 50 YALE L.J. 827 (1941).
75. PATON, A TPxT-BoOK O1FJURISPRUDENCE 119 (1964).
76. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); Cf. BFNN & PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES
oF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 84 (1959) for a criticism of the approach.
77. LL EWLLYN, op. cit. supra note 66, at 112.
78. BODENHEIMER, op. cit. supra note 57, at 192.
79. Hall, The Progress of American Jurisprudence, in THE ADMINISTRATION oF
JUSTICE IN RETROSPECT 36-37 (1957).
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There is, therefore, an attempt in modern jurisprudence to reevaluate the natural law tradition in terms of the modern, scientific
empirical bias. Some would claim that natural law jurisprudence on
that basis could provide a scientifically verified theory of first order
facts about nature and rational man. ° While many would hesitate to
admit a return to the categories of natural law, there does seem to be a
gradual movement in that direction led, strangely, by writers whose
work has previously been in the realist school. Many adherents of
more traditional natural law views may dislike this trend because it is
ztill anti-metaphysical in spirit, but it may lead to a rapprochement in
jurisprudence under a vague but general agreement on the place of
value judgments in the law. If the idea of justice has always occupied
the central place in the philosophy of natural law, writers of many
persuasions are finding a consensus in the need to pursue the ideal of
justice. Perhaps a common statement of belief might be phrased: "An
unjust law . ..is a perfectly intelligible conception if we understand
it as meaning simply a law which, valid in itself, conflicts with the
scale of values by which we choose to judge it."'"
This minimum statement may be the most one can do to identify
a common vantage point for the ethical criticism of positive law. Put
in a concrete form, one may distinguish between a good legal system
and a bad one on the basis of the law's conformity to the norms of
the society in which it is found. The search for a universal set of
norms has not yet been successful and indeed may be beyond the
grasp of men. This may be a greatly diminished version of natural
law, but it is a generally acceptable one. The search for a central
S2
element in human striving may be a fruitless hunt for jurisprudents.
The idea of a higher truth and a higher justice than that of
positive law need not require resort to metaphysical explanation. The
Constitution of the United States, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and other basic documents supply examples of higher law
community norms. Without requiring a return to neo-scholasticism,
after the approach of Aquinas, there can be an acceptance of the
necessity of a minimum content of natural law in any legal philosophy
to be constructed in the future. By this is meant more than a mere
observation that there is a moral content in any legal assertion."3
80. Northrop, Contemporary Jurisprudence and International Law, 61 YALE L.J.
623, 650 (1952).
81. LLOYD, THi IDXA OF LAW 131 (1964).
82. FULLER, THt MORa.ITY OF LAW 185-86 (1964) criticizes Hart and others
for the futility of the search, but proceeds to find the central principle of the natural
law in the maintenance of communication with one's fellows, an almost empty phrase.
83. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND MORAL LAW (1953).
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Instead, one may anticipate a newer version of higher law based upon
the observable and verifiable norms of a growing society. As Laski
wrote to Holmes earlier in the century: "The truth is that we are
witnessing a revival of 'natural' law and 'natural' is the purely
inductive statement of certain minimum conditions we can't do without if life is to be decent." 4 As yet, this promise is unfulfilled, but
future work in psychology and sociology should supply the data
missing in the writing of Edmond Cahn.
84. 1 HOLM4S-LASKI LETTRS 116-17 (Howe ed. 1953).
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